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STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM A. FAWCETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent} 
vs. 
SECURITY BENEFIT ASSO-
CIATION, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 6210 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case was tried upon an agreed statement of 
facts, which is before the court. Consequently, the 
parties are in harmony with respect thereto. As ap-
pellant has referred to the parties as plaintiff and de-
fendant, we shall do likewise. 
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QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
The general question is whether the Benefit Cer-
tificate sued upon was in full force and effect for death 
benefit only at the date of the death of Harriett P. 
Fawcett, which resolves itself into the following spec-
fie questions : ( 1) When did the extended insurance 
period commence: (2) Did the endorsement placed up-
on the Certificate constitute a new contract between the 
parties or the exercise of an option provided for in the 
Certificate; ( 3) Is the plaintiff estopped to claim rights 
inconsistent with the endorsement; ( 4) To what extent 
do the laws of Kansas determine the rights of the par-
ties in this case. 
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT 
Before entering into a discussion of the main points 
involved, may \Ve state that we fail to see that the 
method of operation of fraternal benefit societies, dis-
cussed by defendant at page 11, has any bearing upon 
any of the questions in this case. The fundamental dis-
tinction between fraternal benefit societies and so-called 
"old line insurance companies," is that one operates by 
levying assessments to meet its obligations, and the other 
uses the level premium plan. However, so far as this 
case is concerned, there is no difference. The contract 
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provided for the payment of a definite sum, payable 
monthly for a period of twenty years. While the asso-
ciation had the power to levy extra assessments if oc-
casion demanded, as in the case of White v. W.O.W., 
87, Utah 477, 50 Pac. (2d) 422, cited by defendant on 
page 12, that power was not exercised during the life 
of the certificate in this case. Consequently, the fact 
that the term "assessments" is used rather than "pre-
miums" or "payments" or some other like term is of no 
consequence in this case. As defendant has stated on 
page 15, the main question is, "What does the contract 
provide?" A determination of that question, so far as 
applicable here, is foreign to a discussion of the opera-
tion of fraternal benefit societies. 
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I 
THE EXTENDED INSURANCE PERIOD 
OF TEN YEARS PLUS THIRTY DAYS COM-
MENCED OCTOBER 18, 1928, AND TERMIN-
ATED SUBSEQUENT TO THE DATE OF THE 
DEATH OF HARRIETT P. FAWCETT. 
A. THE ASSESSMENT PAID ON FEBRU-
ARY 18, 1922, WAS A MONTHLY ASSESS-
MENT, AND COVERED A PERIOD FROM 
FEBRUARY 18, 1922, TO MARCH 17, 1922 IN-
CLUSIVE. EACH ASSESSMENT THEREAF-
TER FELL DUE ON THE 18TH OF THE 
MONTH, COMMENCING MARCH 18, 1922, 
AND COVERED A FULL MONTH. 
We believe defendant will agree that the theory 
of extended insurance is that it covers a period in ad-
dition to the time covered by the payment of assess-
ments. There is considerable authority for the view 
that extended insurance commences at the expiration 
of the grace period following the due date of the as-
sessment not paid. See annotation in 106 A.L.R. 1276. 
We believe, however, that the majority view is that in 
the absence of any specific contract provision to the 
contrary, extended insurance commences on the due 
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date of the premium which was not paid. We have 
adopted the latter proposition. It therefore becomes 
material for the court to determine the due date of the 
assessments under the contract, and the period covered 
by each assessment. 
We contend that the first assessment covered a per-
iod of one full month, and that each assessment there-
after fell due on the 18th day of each month, commenc-
ing March 18, 1922, and covered a period of one month, 
and that the last assessment paid on September 30, 1928 
covered a period from September 18, 1928 to October 
17, 1928 inclusive. We take this position for the fol-
lowing reasons : 
1. Wording of the contract. 
The Certificate reads in part as follows: 
"In consideration of the statements, answers and 
agreements in the application of the member, 
which by this contract are made warranties, and 
in further consideration of the first monthly con-
tribution of $2.35 paid before or at the time of 
the delivery of this Certificate, and thereafter 
$2.35 to be paid within each month to the Finan-
cier of the Local Council, for a completed per-
iod of twenty years from the date of the first pay-
ment thereon." (Italics ours) (Ab. 42.) 
The first payment was made on February 18, 1922. 
(A b. 26.) It would seem that the language of the Cer-
tificate which is italicized above requires the interpre-
tation contended for. The first payment by the terms 
of the Certificate was a "monthly" payment, the only 
logical conclusion being that it covered a full month's 
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period and not a portion of a month. The court will 
note that such general expressions as "first monthly 
contribution" and "within each month" are used in 
the Certificate, and "first day of the month" and "last 
day of the month" in the Constitution and Laws. (Ab. 
49-50.) In addition to such general expressions, there 
is the provision in the Certificate italicized above, 
which requires assessments to be paid "within each 
month for a completed period of twenty years from 
the date of the first payment thereon." We need not 
cite authority for the proposition that the court will 
construe all provisions of the contract together, which 
requires the general expressions to be construed along 
with and in reference to the date of the first payment. 
The defendant would have the court construe the gen-
eral expressions without reference to the fixed date and 
therefore contends that "first day of the month" and 
"last day of the month" means first and last days of any 
of the months of the calendar, such as March, April or 
] une, etc. Defendant asks the court to adopt a con-
struction which wholly ignores the effect of the fixed 
date upon the general expressions. On the other hand, 
we urge upon the court a construction which takes 
into consideration the effect of the fixed date on the 
general expressions. To state it another way "first and 
last day of the month" as used in the Constitution and 
Laws must have reference to the day of the month when 
the first assessment was paid, which would necessarily 
determine the day of the month when subsequent assess-
ments fell due. The first day of the month for the pay-
ment of assessments was determined by the first pay-
ment made on the certificate to be the 18th day thereof. 
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Defendant criticizes us on pages 16 and 17 for urging 
that "first day of the month" means the 18th day and 
"last day of the month" means the 17th day. On the 
other hand, we maintain our contention is sound, and 
it is the only way the general provisions can be har-
monized with the fixed date. Furthermore, our con-
tention has its counterpart elsewhere. Many corpora-
tions have their fiscal year commence on March 1st. 
The first day of the fiscal year does not, therefore, cor-
respond with the first day of the year as ordinarily un-
derstood. In the same way, the first day of the month 
for the payment of assessments does not necessarily cor-
respond with the first day of the months of the calendar. 
Defendant has indicated some of the difficulties 
involved with its construction. (Page 23) If the first 
payment carried the Certificate down to the end of 
February, 1922, and another fell due on March 1, 
1922, we fail to see how the defendant can escape one 
of two conclusions; namely, that the first assessment 
was for term insurance to March 1, 1922, or that it 
was not a monthly assessment and did not cover a full 
month's period. Defendant tries to answer these ob-
jections by definitely eliminating the first, and as to 
the second, by stating that the provision in the contract 
to the effect that the first assessment was for the month 
"in which the Certificate was delivered" meant the 
month of February, 1922. To take this position, how-
ever, defendant ignores the provision in the contract 
that designates the assessment as a "monthly contribu-
tion." As discussed more fully hereafter, we submit 
that "monthly" means a full month's period. 
If defendant's contention is correct, the 240th 
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assessment would fall due on January 1, 1942, and if 
not paid, would be delinquent on February 1, 1942. 
To avoid a forfeiture, the 240th assessment would have 
to be paid before February 1, 1942, and yet the Certifi-
cate would not mature until February 18, 1942, leaving 
a gap from February 1st to February 18, 1942. General-
ly speaking, in insurance contracts the last premium is 
paid prior to maturity, but it is uniformly true that 
the maturity date of the policy and the end of the per-
iod covered by the last premium correspond, which 
thy don't under defendant's construction. Defendant, 
on pages 24 and 25, tries to meet this objection by say-
ing this provision of the contract is not before the 
court. The question of whether the Certificate would 
be forfeited or not by the failure to pay the 241st assess-
ment is not before the court, but the provisions of the 
contract relating to the due date of assessments and the 
period they covered are before the court. The reason 
given by the defendant for the necessity of the language 
"twenty years from the date of the first payment there-
on" tends to strengthen our view, and defendant therein 
admits that the date of the first payment controls so 
far as subsequent payments are concerned. Defend-
ant admits that if Mrs. Fawcett had not paid the first 
assessment until April 14, 1922 (sixty days after its 
date), the Certificate would not mature until April 14, 
1942. However, regardless of the date of payment, the 
240th payment, to adopt defendant's view, would have 
to be paid before the first day of the month in which 
the Certificate matured, leaving the gap mentioned 
above. The above difficulties are avoided if plaintiff's 
view is adopted. 
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2. Judicial interpretation. 
We have made an exhaustive search and have 
found no case squarely in point on the construction of a 
contract similar to the one before the court. We have, 
however, found two cases which adopt the theory which 
supports our contention. The defendant has cited no 
case against our view, nor have we been able to find 
any. We shall first discuss the two cases which support 
our position and then comment on the cases cited by 
the defendant. 
In Sovereign Camp of W. of W. v. Reed, 94 So. 
910 (Ala.), the facts were as follows: The certificate 
was dated December 15, 1919, the policy delivered, 
and the first monthly payment of $1.60 was paid on 
December 31, 1919. There was $3.20 paid on January 
28, 1920 and the deceased died on the 25th of February, 
1920. The certificate had the following clause: 
"This certificate is granted in consideration of 
the monthly premium hereinbefore stated in the 
schedule and of the payment of a like amount 
on or before the 1st day of each consecutive 
month thereafter during the continuance of this 
contract, and the further consideration of the 
delivery of this certificate during the lifetime 
and good health of the member." 
The court stated on page 913: 
"In the contract are employed the words refer-
ring to the payment of premiums, 'monthly in-
stallments,' 'following months,' and 'monthly 
payment.' The word 'month' as so used in the 
beneficiary certificate and exhibits thereto or 
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documents incorporated therein by agreement of 
the parties, had reference to a calendar month." 
The court, after citing the familiar rule of construction 
of a policy to be in favor of the assured, stated on page 
913 as follows: 
"When the contract sued upon is so construed, 
and the advance payment of $1.60 as a monthly 
premium on December 31, 1919 is held to be for 
the calendar month to follow, no forfeiture en-
sued for non-payment of premiums. The receipt 
book in evidence indicated a like sum on January 
28, 1920, and on the same day an additional sum 
of $1.60. If these payments were preperly made 
to the defendant as premiums on the beneficiary 
certificate the same was extended and in force to 
and within the month of March." (Italics ours.) 
The latter part of the above sentence which is italicized 
may be dicta so .far as it says that the certificate was 
in force to and within the month of March, but the first 
part of the quotation is not dicta because it was one 
theory on which the case was decided, as is indicated 
by the court's statement on page 916: 
"This (referring to the fact that the certificate 
was in force at the death of the deceased) is not 
only true when Sections 57 and 58-A of the con-
stitution are considered, but is true because of 
the general principle we have stated that the 
term 'month' whether employed in statutes or 
contracts and not appearing to have been used 
in a different sense, denotes a period terminat-
ing with the day of the succeeding month numer-
ically corresponding to the date of its beginning 
less one. If there be no corresponding day of the 
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The other case is Rybczymski v. Chicago Frater-
nal Life Assurance Company, 227 N.Y.S. 366. The 
deceased applied for insurance on January 5, 1926. The 
application was approved on January 15, 1926, and a 
one year premium was paid in advance on January 27, 
1926. The company issued a certificate and dated it 
January 1, 1926. The certificate was not delivered, but 
a request was made for a change of beneficiary. The 
defendant issued a new certificate dated February 3, 
1926, which was delivered. A check for the second 
year's premium, dated February 2, 1927, was received 
by the company on February 5, 1927, and returned. 
The insured died on February 16, 1927. The certificate 
provided: 
"If a member elects to pay quarterly, semi-an-
nually or annually, such payments shall be due 
on the first day of the calendar month of the 
quarterly, semi-annual or annual period, and 
must be paid on or before the last day of the 
month." 
The certificate further provided: 
"Should the member refuse or fail to make peri-
odical payments at the time stipulated for such 
payment ... the certificate is to be void." 
Th~ court says on page 368: 
"There was no time stipulated for such payment 
in the benefit certificate, save as its date, Febru-
ary 3, 1926, be taken in connection with the 
clause requiring quarterly, semi-annual or an-
nual payments to be due on the first day of the 
calendar month of the quarterly, semi-annual 
or annual period, and must be paid on or before 
11 
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the last day of said month. That would give at 
least the month of February, 1927 for the pay-
ment of the second annual premium before for-
feiture. The insured died within the calendar 
month of the expiration of the one year perior 
of the policy." (Italics ours.} 
We recognize that in neither of these cases was 
the date of the death of the assured subsequent to a date · 
when the certificate would have been forfeited, under 
the defendant's view, but undoubtedly the court 
adopted the same theory in each case, which theory is 
authority for our contention. The point we wish to 
stress is that in each of the cases the court "tied in" 
the general expressions to a definite date. In the Reed 
case, the court tied in the general expressions to the 
date December 31, 1919, and said the first premium 
was "for a calendar month to follow." Under de-
fendant's interpretation, the payment of the first pre-
mium would have covered one day only, and another 
would have been due on January 1, 1920. Likewise, 
in the Rybczymski case the general expressions are tied 
in to the date of the policy, February 3, 1926, and "cal-
endar month" was tied into the date of the expiration 
of the one pear period of the policy. (See last italicized 
portion a hove.) 
As stated above, defendant has cited no author-
ity against our contention, nor do the cases cited by 
defendant support its contention because in none of 
them was the question raised which is before this court, 
and in none of them did the court have a contract be-
fore it which is the same as in the instant case. 
The case of Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Rhyne, 171 
Miss. 687, 158 So. 472, cited by defendant on page 17, 
12 
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can be distinguished from the one at bar for the reason 
that the contract provision for the payment of pre-
miums had no reference to a fixed date. 
The case of Craig v. Golden Rule Life Ins. Co., 
184 Ark. 48, 41 S.W. (2d) 769, cited by defendant on 
page 18, is readily distinguishable in that the applica-
tion recited the second premium would be due on No-
vember 1, 1929, and that the policy was "granted in 
consideration of the application and the payment of 
85 cents on or before the 1st day of October, 1929, and 
a like payment on or before the 1st of each month dur-
ing the calendar year and monthly payments in ad-
vance thereafter, increasing annually on January 1st of 
each year in accordance with the cash savings step rate 
plan." 
The question of construction of the contract was 
not before this court in the case of Moran v. Knights 
of Columbus, 46 Utah 397, 151 Pac. 353, cited by de-
fendant at page 19. The question there was whether 
the insurance company could insist upon a forfeiture 
when it had subsequently accepted payments on the 
certificate. There was no qeustion of the interpretation 
of the contract to determine whether a forfeiture had 
occurred. If the Moran case is indicative of the "thou-
sands of cases" referred to by defendant on page 20, 
we are not surprised that defendant failed to include 
more of them in its brief. 
The provisions of the contract relating to due 
dates of assessments and periods covered thereby are 
not stated in the opinion of this court in Kennedy v. 
M. W. A., 92 Utah 487, 69 Pac. (2d) 508, cited by 
defendant on page 19, and no question is raised with 
13 
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respect to the interpretation thereof. For that reason, 
anything stated by this court in that case concerning 
the time when the certificate became forfeited because 
of non-payment of assessments has nothing to do with 
the case at bar. We agree with defendant that the books 
are full of such cases as the Kennedy case, but it can-
not be concluded that because the question was never 
raised that the courts adopted defendant's view. 
The case of Frysh v. Commercial Casualty Ins. 
Co., 214 Wis. 453, 253 N.W. 184, cited by defendant 
on page 22, is distinguishable for the same reason as 
that pointed out in the Craig case, supra, in that the 
first premium paid the policy down to a definite date, 
namely, May 1, 1931. The court states in the opinion 
that it was the policy of the company to have the con-
tracts run from the first day of one month to the first 
day of the next month, and that the 20th of the month 
was considered to be the "dead line." The first pre-
mium in contracts issued on or before the 20th day of 
the month covered a period down to the first of the next 
month and premiums on policies issued after the 20th 
of the month covered the period down to the first of 
the second month. The insurance company in the Craig 
case, supra, followed the same practice, but used the 
15th day of the month as the "dead line." It will be 
noted, however, in each case the contract itself pro-
vided that the first premium would pay the policy to 
the first of the next or the second month, depending 
upon the date of issue. It is well to note, however, that 
in the contract the due date of the second premium was 
fixed by a definite date and not by a general expression 
such as "first day of the month." Defendant would have 
the court construe the contract in this case on a par 
14 
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with the Craig and Frysh cases. Instead of the con-
tract providing that the first assessment paid the cer-
tificate to the first day of a certain month, defendant's 
contention must rest on general language which in turn 
must be read in connection with a fixed date, which date 
is not in harmony \vith defendant's interpretation of the 
general language. Clearly, then, the Frysh and Craig 
cases are not helpful to defendant. 
3. Calendar month. 
Defendant relies on the quotation from Warfield 
Natural Gas Co. v. Clark, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S.W. (2d) 
21, 97 A.L.R. 971, for the meaning of the expression 
"calendar month." The question in the Warfield case 
was whether the gas company had wrongfully turned 
off the gas in the plaintiff's home. On the back of the 
application was the following: 
"3. The amount payable for the gas furnished 
during each month shall be due on the first day . 
of the following month and unless paid on or 
before the 15th of such month the gas will be 
shut off without further notice. In the event 
service is discontinued during any month the 
amount payable shall be due immediately upon 
such discontinuance." 
Within four or five days after January 11, 1933, the 
company rendered Mrs. Clark a bill for gas furnished 
from December 9, 1932 to January 10, 1933, which had 
on it the statement, "Last day to pay net amount Jan-
uary 26, 1933." The bill was not paid and the gas was 
shut off on February 6, 1933. Apparently it was the 
gas company's contention that they had the right under 
the quoted portion of the contract above to shut the gas 
IS 
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off if the bill remained unpaid for fifteen days from the 
"first day of the following month," meaning that the fol-
·lowing month started on the day following the monthly 
period for which a bill was rendered for gas furnished. 
The court gave the definition of the words "calendar 
month" as given in Webster's New International Dic-
tionary, 
" ( 1) any of the months as adjusted in the cal-
endar, now the Gregorian. April, June, Sep-
tember and November now contain 30 days, and 
the rest 31, except February, which has 28, and, 
in leap years, 29. (2) The time from any day 
of such a month to the corresponding day (if 
any; if not, to the last day) of the next month." 
The court in the Warfield case adopted the first con-
struction. The case, however, is readily distinguished 
from the one at bar. In the Warfield case the contract 
provisions "on the first day of the following month" 
and "on or before the 15th of such month" do not have 
reference to and are not connected with any particular 
month or day of a particular month for the time of 
commencement. On the other hand, when "calendar 
month" is used in connection with a contract of insur-
ance and is tied into a fixed date, as was the case in 
Shira v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed (2d) 953, cited 
by defendant on page 21, Webster's second meaning of 
"calendar month" is adopted. 
The provision in the contract for payment of pre-
miums was as follows: 
"This contract is made in consideration of the 
application therefor, and of the payment in ad-
16 
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vance of the sum of $78.40, the receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged, constituting the first 
premium and maintaining this policy for the 
period terminating on the second day of April, 
Nineteen Hundred and Thirty, and of a like sum 
on said date and every three calendar months 
thereafter during the life of the Insured." 
The court said on page 9 56: 
"The contract expressly provided that the initial 
premium would cover a period terminating on 
April 2, 1930, and that the insured should pay 
a like premium every three calendar months 
thereafter to maintain the policy." 
There is no question as to the meaning of the phrase 
"every three calendar months thereafter" as the court 
said on page 955: "Insured failed to pay the premium · 
due April 2, 1933." In other words, "three calendar 
months thereafter," when tied to a definite date as in 
the Shira case, meant on the date corresponding to the. 
fixed date every three months, which would be the 2nd 
day of July, October and January of each year, whereas 
defendant's interpretation would require the uncalled 
for construction that premiums fell due on the first day 
qf July, October, January and April thereafter. The 
same interpretation is used in many cases where a fixed 
date is involved. 
Thus, in Shea v. Graves, 19 Pac. (2d) 406, (Ore.), 
it was held that a complaint to foreclose a mechanic's 
lien filed on November 2, 1938, was filed within six 
months from May 2, 1938, the date of the filing of the 
lien, and in Hayward Lumber & Investment Co. v. 
Corbett, 33 Pac. (2d) 41 (Calif.), the court held that 
17 
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a notice of default dated April 18, 1929, was premature 
under a trust providing that the trust should be in de-
fault for three months before the whole amount of the 
obligation would become due and payable, where the 
first default was February 1, 1929. The notice could 
not be effective if dated before May 1, 1929. The fol-
lowing is a quotation from Langley v. State, 155 So. 
682, (Miss.) : 
"The term 'month' when used in any statute 
means a calendar month unless a contrary in-
tention be expressed ... in computing which 
time must be reckoned by looking at the cal-
endar and not by counting days, and when not 
coincident with the particular month named in 
the calendar, such a month is the period of time 
from the day from which the month is to be 
computed to the day numerically corresponding 
thereto in the following month less one, if the 
following_ month has so many days; if not, to the 
last day thereof." 
The Alabama court, in the recent case of Daniel 
v. Ormand, 163 So. 361 (Ala.), still uses the same in-
terpretation of the phrase . "calendar month" as was 
used in Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. v. Reed, 94, So. 
910, which defendant criticizes on page 26. The court 
says in the Daniel case: 
"With us, the word 'month,' unless otherwise ex-
pressed, means a 'calendar month,' Code 1928, 
Para. 9, Sov. Camp W.O.W. v. Reed, 208 Ala. 
457, 94 So. 910, which according to Webster's 
New International Dictionary means the time 
from any day of any of the months as adjusted 
in the calendar to the corresponding day (if any; 
if not, to the last day) of the next month." 
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The case which best illustrates the importance of 
the meaning of calendar month as tied to a specific 
date which we have been able to find, is Schissler v. 
Wisconsin Life Ins. Co., 202 N.W. 177 (Wis.). The 
plaintiff had a contract with the defendant giving him 
exclusive right to sell insurance in a certain area, with 
certain provisions of cancellation, one of which was 
that defendant could cancel the contract if plaintiff 
failed for two consecutive months to produce any ac-
cepted and paid for business. The plaintiff failed from 
January 4, to March 15, 1917 to produce any applica-
tions for insurance, and defendant exercised its privil-
ege of cancellation. Quoting from the opinion: 
"Such period, however, it is contended by plain-
tiff, was not the 'two consecutive months' under 
Clause 15 quoted above, for the reason, as it is 
argued, that in the absence of a more specific 
designation the months must be calendar months 
and be computed as starting on the first day of 
some month immediately following in which, at 
any time therein, business had been produced, 
and that therefore, the applications of January 
4th prevented the commencement of the period 
of two consecutive months until the first of Feb-
ruary, and there having been an application pro-
duced in March there was but one instead of 
two calendar months intervening the January 
4th and March 17th applications. Reliance' is 
placed upon Section 4971 ( 10) Statutes, pro-
viding that the word 'month' shall be construed 
to mean a calendar month unless otherwise ex-
pressed. This, however, does not determine the 
time for commencement of a period computed 
in calendar rather than lunar months. This stat-
ute also provides that where the word year is 
used it means a calendar year. The contract in 
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question was made December 3, 1914, and clear-
ly, the yearly period referred to in the contract 
within which a specified amount of business was 
required to be produced in order that plaintiffs 
might preserve their exclusive territory would 
expire on the 4th of December of each year 
thereafter rather than merely starting on the 
first of January following. By the same reason-
ing, the expressions here involved should be 
computed as the period of two calendar months 
from the day upon which any particular insur-
ance business was produced. More than such 
period had clearly expired at the time of the 
obtaining of the policy on March 17th." (Italics 
ours.) 
4. Construction of By-Laws and Certificate~ 
Without reiterating again the provisions of the 
By-Laws and ~ertificate with reference to due dates 
of assesments, etc., may we state that the wording of the 
By-Laws standing alone and apart from the Certificate 
tends to support defendant's contention, and likewise, 
we maintain there is little or no question about our po-
sition based upon the wording of the Certificate alone. 
How then shall the court construe the contract? It is 
elementary that the court will construe the entire con-
tract and harmonize the provisions contained therein 
if possible. This can be done only if "first day" and 
"last day" of the month, as used in the Laws, are con-
sidered in connection with the date when the first as-
sessment was paid as used in the Certificate, thus mak-
ing the first day of the month the 18th and the last day 
the 17th of the next month, commencing February 18, 
1922, and continuing for twenty years thereafter. 
It is only when the contention of the defendant is 
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urged that ambiguity exists. There is no way that am-
biguity can be avoided if "first" and "last" day of 
the month, as used in the Laws, refers to the first and 
last day of March, April or JY1ay, etc., when considered 
in connection with the wording of the certificate. 
However, if there is ambiguity between the Laws 
and the Certificate, there is ample authority holding 
that the wording of the Certificate controls. The fol-
lowing cases hold that where there is a conflict between 
the By-Laws and the policy, the policy will prevail 
over the By-La\vs: Masson v. Woodmen of Union 
(Ark.), 262 S.W. 648; Greenlaw v. Aroostook County 
P.M. F. (Maine), 105 Atl. 116; Faileyv. Fee (Md.), 
34 Atl. 839; Davidson v. Old People, etc. (Minn.) 39 
N.W. 803; Eminent Household v. Bunch (Miss.), 76 
So. 540; Courtney v. Fidelity Mutual Aid Society 
(Missouri), 94 S.W. 768. 
A very recent case from Kansas, the state of the 
incorporation of the defendant company, is that of 
Lawson v. Brotherhood of American Y oemen, 25 P. 
(2d) 344, which holds: 
"Where the contract consists of the by-laws, the 
certificate, and certain other documents, all 
should be considered. They should be construed 
together. If there is inconsistency in them when 
so considered, the court will, when interpreta-
tion is possible, so construe them as to give the 
insured the benefit of provisions favorable to 
him." Quoting several cases. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of May-
nard v. Locomotive Engineer's Mutual Life, 16 Utah 
145, 51 P. 259, has held substantially the same thing. 
The court says on page 260: 
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"The terms of the by-laws in question must be 
interpreted liberally and reasonably, and, as they 
appear to be susceptible of two constructions, 
that must be adopted which will more nearly 
carry out the benign object of the association and 
sustain the claim of the insured. The provisions 
will not be scrutinized for the purpose of en-
abling the organization to escape liability to 
any of its members, or for the purpose of creat-
ing limitations in favor of the association which 
do not satisfactorily appear within the terms of 
the by-laws. Where associations or corporations 
are organized for the purpose of mutual bene-
fit and relief, their by-laws will not be so inter-
preted as to favor the forfeiture of the rights 
of its members." 
When plaintiff's view is adopted, there is no am-
biguity in the contract, but if defendant's view is ac-
cepted, ambiguity cannot be avoided. If there is am-
biguity, the wording of the Certificate controls and the 
construction most favorable to the insured must be 
adopted. In either event, the court should affirm the 
decision of the lower court for the plaintiff. 
5. First monthly contribution. 
The Certificate was issued in consideration "of the 
first monthly contribution .... " We contend that the 
first assessment covered a period of one full month 
from the time it was paid. We recognize the general 
rule, as stated by the defendant on page 13, that the 
parties to an insurance contract may agree that future 
premiums shall be paid on certain dates in spite of the 
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fact that the first premium may not cover a full month 
or a full year. The corollary of this statement is also 
true. In the absence of contract providing otherwise, 
the assessment which is called a "monthly" assessment 
must be held to cover a full month. The question, of 
course, arises whether or not there is a provision in 
the contract requiring the second assessment to be paid 
short of one month from the date of the payment of the 
first assessment. Without again repeating what has 
heretofore been said about definite fixed dates and gen-
eral provisions, we maintain that there is no such con-
tract provision before the court in this case. 
However, in the case of Kennedy v. National Ac-
cident & Health Ins. Co., 76, S.W. (2d) 748 (Mo.), 
even in the face of a provision in the policy limiting 
payment of the first premium which was paid on July 
lOth, to August 1st, the court refused to hold that it did 
not cover a full month. The court said: 
"The initial premium paid on July 1Oth upon 
delivery of the policy was described in the policy 
itself as a monthly premium, so that from the 
very beginning the policy was a monthly pre-
mium payment policy, which carried it, in ac-
cordance with the conclusions above announced, 
from the date of its delivery for one month." 
{Italics ours.) 
And likewise, in the case of Jefferson Standard Life 
Insurance Company v. Myers, 284 S.W. 216 (Texas), 
the court said: 
"In other words, the company, 1n the absence 
of a contract to the contrary, has no right to 
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collect a premium for almost a month before the 
insured has any protection under the policy. 
The premium is for a year." 
6. Assessments fell due on the monthly date cor-
responding to the effective date of the Certificate. 
The Certificate did not become effective until the 
first assessment was paid and the Certificate delivered 
and signed by the applicant during her good health, 
which date was February 18, 1922. (Ab. 46, 49.) There 
is considerable authority for the proposition that when 
the policy does not become effective until delivery, sub-
sequent premiums shall fall due on dates corresponding 
to the effective date of the policy. See annotations in 6 
A.L.R. 774; 32 A.L.R. 1253; 80 A.L.R. 957; and 111 
A.L.R. 1420. We recognize that the cases so holding 
seem to be in the minority where the parties have con-
tracted that subsequent premiums shall fall due on 
definite dates which do not correspond with the effect-
ive date. Granti'ng the majority view to be as stated, 
we have found no cases so holding unless the contract 
definitely fixed the date for the payment of subsequent 
premiums other than to corresponding with the effect-
ive date. We maintain there is no definite date fixed 
in the contract before the court requiring the payment 
of subsequent assesments, other than to correspond with 
the first, which is the effective date of the certificate. 
In the absence of the fixing of such a date by the con-
tract, the cases cited in the A.L.R. annotations above, 
which appear to be in the minority so far as the prop-
osition there annotated is concerned, undoubtedly are 
good authority for the contention we make herein. 
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B. HARRIETT P. FAWCETT WAS EN-
TITLED TO EXTENDED INSURANCE COM-
MENCING ON A DATE CORRESPONDING 
TO THE DATE TO WHICH ASSESSMENTS 
WERE PAID AS DETERMINED BY THE EF-
FECTIVE DATE OF THE CERTIFICATE, 
WHICH WAS FEBRUARY 18, 1922. 
Authority for the above statement is the recent 
case of Harvey v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 45 Fed. 
(2d) 78. The application was dated October 22, 1918, 
and was approved November 7, 1918. The policy was 
dated November 9, 1918, and provided for the payment 
of an annual premium on October 22nd of each year. 
The policy provided that the insurance became effective 
on the date of the approval of the application. There 
was a provision for extended insurance wh~ch, accord-
ing to the amount on hand at the time of default in 
payment of premiums, covered a period of two hun-
dred thirty-seven days. The insurance company fig-
ured the extended insurance from October 22, 1928 to 
June 16, 1929. The insured died on June 25, 1929. The 
beneficiary contended the extended insurance should 
have been figured from November 7, 1928, the anni-
versary of the date of the approval of the application, 
and which would have included the date of the death 
of the deceased. The court held that the extended in-
surance should have been figured from the anniversary 
of the effective date of the policy and not from the the 
anniversary of the date provided for the payment of 
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premiums. The following excerpts from the opinion 
are enlightening. The court says in the first column 
on page 81: 
"Three separate dates are mentioned in the pol-
icy. October 22 is definitely fixed as the date 
upon which annual premiums must be paid in 
advance. It was agreed, however, that the pol-
icy should not become effective until the ap-
plication was approved by the company and the 
date of such approval is November 7. The pol-
icy itself was not signed by the company nor 
dated until November 9. The result of the agree-
ment between the parties was to require the in-
sured to prepay his premiums sixteen days be-
fore receiving any benefit therefrom. It was an 
apparently somewhat insignificant and perhaps 
unforeseen hardship to which he became bound. 
In the matter of lapse it might have been ser-
ious, and if appellee's contention is correct, it 
results in the tragedy of forfeiture." 
and further states in the second column on page 81 : 
"There can be no doubt under the decisions that 
the requirement to pay premiums annually in 
advance on October 22 was a valid and binding 
agreement. The minds of the parties definitely 
met upon that point, and there is nothing in the 
record to indicate that the insured was in any 
way misled. Failure to pay any annual premiu-m 
on that date resulted, after thirty days' grace, 
in lapse. This only meant, however, that there-
after the insured had forfeited his right to keep 
the policy alive by subsequent payment of pre-
miums. To restore such right required reinstate-
ment under the rules and regulations of the com-
pany. Such lapse, however, in no way avoided 
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his right to extended insurance if entitled thereto 
under the other conditions of the policy." 
The court further states in the first column on page 82: 
"A review of the numerous authorities cited in 
appellee's brief will disclose no case, nor do 
we think any can be found, of persuasive force, 
in which the mere provision for payment of pre-
miums in advance was construed to overcome 
the plain provisions of a policy that it should 
take effect on a subsequent date. ·Had the par-
ties agreed that the policy should not become 
effective until approved but that if and when 
approved the insurance year should run from 
October 22, appellee's contention would be sus-
tained by the weight of authority. It has been 
held in numerous cases that where the effective 
date of a policy is agreed upon as the beginning 
of the policy year, such date must govern though 
the premium may not have been paid until a 
later date nor the policy delivered until such 
time." 
and further in the second column on page 82: 
"A reference to the policy will clearly show that 
the date, October 22, related only to the day for 
paying premiums. In providing for incontest-
ability, article 21 of the policy provides that it 
shall be incontestable after one year 'from date 
of issue, except for non-payment of premium,' 
and certainly the policy was not issued until the 
application was approved by the company. In 
article 25 it is provided that the policy shall be 
avoided by the suicide of the insured 'within one 
year.' We cannot conceive of the company's as-
serting that this limited the time to one year 
from: the date of the application and the date 
of the payment of premium. The expression 
'policy year' or 'end of policy year' is mentioned 
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no less than three times in the policy, and there 
also appears the expression 'on the anniversary 
of the policy.' This evidently refers to the an-
niversary of the birth of the policy which oc-
curred on the approval of the application. It is 
true that option 1, article 14, of the policy states 
that the reserve value shall be applied to the 
extension of this policy as participating term in: 
surance 'from the date to which premiums have 
been paid.' It does not state, however, that this 
shall be from the date on which premiums are 
paid or are required to be paid. Subscriptions 
to newspapers and periodicals are frequently re-
quired to be paid in advance, but when an annual 
subscription is thus paid, it is paid to the anniver-
sary date from which the subscription begins to 
run and not from the date on which payment was 
made. The same is frequently applied to other 
business organizations, social clubs, etc. Where 
dues are paid in advance, they are universally 
recognized as covering the period from which 
the privilege, for which payment is made, begins 
to run and not from the date of payment itself. 
We think it clear, therefore, that the date to 
which premiums were paid as provided in the 
policy was the end of the policy year from which 
the insurance became effective." (Italics ours.) 
We think the Harvey case goes farther than is necessary 
to sustain our position. In the Harvey case there was 
a definite date in the policy for payment of the second 
and subsequent premiums short of one year from the 
effective date, which is not true in the case at ba.r. Even 
if defendant's view that the second assessment fell due 
on March 1, 1922 be adopted, the Harvey case is au-
thority for the proposition that extended insurance shall 
be figured from the date premiums are paid to as deter-
mined by the effective date of the policy. As stated in 
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the Harvey case, the date October 22nd related only 
to payment of premiums. But all the other rights of 
the parties, such as incontestability, suicide clause, etc., 
were determined from "date of issue." Likewise, in 
the case at bar the rights of the parties, even including 
the date for payment of premiums, are determined with 
reference to the effective date of the certificate, as is 
indicated by the following excerpts from the Certifi-
cate and the Laws : 
"(5) This Certificate shall not take effect until 
all required assessments have been paid and the 
Certificate signed by the applicant in person, 
and during the applicant's good health." (Ab. 
46.) 
Sections 96 and 98 (Exhibit No.3, pages 45, 46) read 
in part as follows : 
"Sec. 96: .... such Beneficiary Certificate 
shall not become effective until manually de-
livered to the applicant while the applicant is 
in good health and the assessment and dues, for 
the month in which the Certificate is delivered, 
have been paid and said Beneficiary Certificate 
signed by the applicant while in good health, 
nor unless delivered within sixty days after the 
date thereof." 
"Sec. 98: When Certificate in Force. The Ben-
eficiary Certificate shall become effective and 
be in force from and after the initiation of the 
member and the payment of one assessment and 
Subordinate Council dues to the Financier, the 
Certificate having been signed by the member 
and delivered to him while in good health." 
We think the wording of the last part of the ex-
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cerpt from the second column of page 82 in the Harvey 
case is very significant as applied to our case. The de-
fendant urges it is good business policy for insurance 
companies to have definite dates for payment of assess-
ments, and that therefore, first day of the month as used 
in the Laws means the first day of March, etc. Granting 
this to be true, it does not alter the right of the insured 
to extend insurance, according to the Harvey case. In 
other words, for the convenience of the company in 
having a definite date for payment of assessments, it 
may be necessary, in order to avoid a forfeiture, for the 
insured to pay assessments on or before the last day of 
each month of the calendar. But as stated in the Harvey 
case, the payment may be required to be made in ad-
vance, but covers a period beyond the time when the 
next falls due. Therefore, taking defendant's conten-
tion as to the due date of assessments to mean that the 
last one paid fell due on September 1, 1928, and had 
to be paid on or before the last day of September, 1928, 
still under the Harvey case it covered a period from 
September 18, 1928 to October 17, 1928, inclusive, and 
extended insurance should have been figured from that 
time. 
We do not believe the above construction necessary 
to our case for the reasons stated herein. But such a 
construction is essentially fair to both parties. It gives 
effect to the definiteness of the date for payment of 
assessments desired by the insurance company, and at 
the same time gives the insured the benefit of a full 
month's insurance for each assessment. If the insured 
is to get one full month's insurance for each assessment, 
this can be accomplished with the construction sug-
gested in the Harvey case. 
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II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE BEFORE THE 
COURT OF THE CONSTRl1CTION THE PAR-
TIES PLACED ON THE CONTRACT. 
To adopt the rule contended for by defendant on 
page 31, there must be some evidence of the construc-
tion the parties placed on the contract. In the case of 
Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 724, 
81 S.W. (2d) 313, cited by defendant on page 31, the 
court held that the interpretation the insured had 
adopted must control. However, there could be no 
question as to his interpretation as he had requested 
the payment of premiums as of April 15th and had 
paid premiums on the basis that April 15th was the due 
date for several years, and had signed an application 
for reinstatement upon two occasions on the basis that 
he had not paid the premium which fell due on April 
15th. What evidence is there in this case that Harriett 
P. Fawcett ever adopted the defendant's construction? 
The date of the last payment, September 30, 1928, is 
just as consistent with plaintiff's view as with that of 
defendant. Defendant urges that the assured adopted 
its view when she retained the Certificate with the en-
dorsement on it for over ten years without objection. 
No weight can be attached to the fact that the assured 
retained the Certificate with the endorsement on it with-
out objection for the reason that such fact does not go 
to show what her interpretation of the contract was 
with reference to the payment of assessments. The con-
tract in no place states the date or time from which 
extended insurance shall be figured. There is nothing 
in the application for extended insurance or the en-
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dorsement which attempts to tie the date of its com-
mencement with the date for payment of assessments. 
The books are full of litigation as to when the period 
of extended insurance begins. We have adopted in this 
case what we consider to be the majority rule, that in 
the absence of a contract provision to the contrary the 
extended insurance begins to run on the due date of 
the premium which was not paid. Other courts have 
held that it starts at the end of the grace period, which 
rule, if adopted by this court would permit recovery 
by plaintiff under defendant's theory. See annotation 
entitled, "Due Date of Premium or Date of Expira-
tion of Grace Period as Commencement of Period of 
Extended Insurance," 106 A.L.R. 1276. A third pos-
sibility is found in the Harvey case, supra, and there 
are others. If the contract had contained a provision 
that extended insurance was to commence on the due 
date of the assesment which was not paid, or some sim-
ilar provision, there might be some basis for defend-
ant's contention, but in view of the fact that the high-
est courts of the land are not in harmony on the subject 
of the time of commencement of extended insurance 
and some courts hold that its commencement is not 
necessarily connected with the due date of premiums, 
no significance can be attached to the fact that Mrs. 
Fawcett failed to object to the terms of the endorse-
ment so far as such fact is related to her interpretation 
of the contract as to the due dates of assessments. 
We refer the court to our discussion on the head-
ing of estoppel herein for the futility of objection by 
the assured if she did not adopt defendant's construc-
tion. Her failure to object is of no consequence by way 
of evidence of her interpretation of the contract. 
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III 
THE ENDORSEMENT ON THE CERTIFI-
CATE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A NEW CON-
TRACT. 
We contend that the right to extended insurance 
existed in the Certificate itself, and that after the re-
quired number of assessments were paid the assured 
was entitled, as a matter of right, by filing a written 
application, to extended insurance for the period stated 
in the table of values in the Certificate. Making writ-
ten application for extended insurance was the exercise 
by the assured of one of the options granted to her 
in the Certificate. The only contract provision for ex-
tended insurance is in the Certificate as follows: 
"VI. The Security Benefit Association promises 
to Waive periodical contributions hereinbefore 
stipulated and to continue protection for death 
benefit only to the said member in the amount 
of the face of this Certificate during such period 
as its withdrawal equity, taken as a single pre-
mium, will purchase as temporary protection; 
provided the member has made the stipulated 
periodical contributions without default for not 
less than three years prior to the application for 
this privilege, and has maintained his status as 
a member as required and presscribed in the 
Constitution and Laws of the Association." (Ab. 
44.) 
The application for extended insurance, a form furn-
ished by the company, reads in part as follows: 
"I desire to exercise my option to discontinue 
beneficiary contributions .... and I desire to 
change beneficiary certificate No. 911864, dated 
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February 14, 1922, for $1000.00 to continued or 
extended whole life protection, for death bene-
fit only .... " (Ab. 51, 52.) 
The right to extended insurance accrued upon 
application made by virtue of the terms of the Certifi-
cate itself, apart from and independent of the endorse-
ment. The endorsement was not necessary to the cre-
ation of the right. Indeed no. act on the part of the 
company was necessary to create such right, but merely 
the election of the assured by filing an application. The 
right was inchoate at the issuance of the Certificate 
and became vested when application was filed, and the 
endorsement itself is merely an attempt to state the 
period covered by the extended insurance, and does 
not amount to a ne\v contract. 
It is well to note that the application states as 
follows: 
"At the expiration of which time the Certificate 
shall be void and cancelled by expiry." (Ab. 52.) 
and the endorsement says: 
"As part of the consideration for this extention 
the said Harriett P. Fawcett agrees to surrender 
this Certificate for cancellation after the expira-
tion thereof as above described." (Ab. 27.) 
indicating definitely that is was intended that the Cer-
tificate should be in force as modified by the option, 
until the expiration of the extended insurance period. 
Clearly, if the transaction was a new contract, the Cer-
tificate would have been surrendered at the time and 
not at the expiration of the extended insurance period. 
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It is well to note also in this connection, that in 
her application Harriett P. Fawcett asks for extended 
insurance for ten years and thirty days, but it does not 
state from any definite time. 
We have been fortunate In finding an excellent 
case on this point. In New York Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Gilbert, a Missouri case decided in 1923, and 
reported in 256 S.W. 148, this question is discussed. 
The facts of the case are as follows: The insured had a 
loan on his policy. He had discontinued payment of 
premiums. He wrote to the company on December 
4, 1920, and asked how much paid up insurance he 
could get after cancellation of the loan. The company 
wrote back stating he would have paid up insurance 
for $768.00. The company later found it had made a 
mistake and that the policy was good for only $296.00 
in paid up insurance. An endorsement was made on the 
policy showing it was worth $768.00 in paid up in-
surance, and the policy with the endorsement was for-
warded to the insured. The mistake was discovered 
about a year later. The court held that the company 
was entitled to have the endorsement reformed to cor-
respond to the true amount. The question of option or 
new contract was involved. The court stated on page 
150: 
"It would seem that the determinative question 
in this case is: Was it intended to settle in ac-
cordance with the terms of a previous contract 
or agreement, or was it intended to settle upon 
an greement outside of the terms of the policy, 
showing an intention to extinguish the old con-
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tract and make a new one? It seems quite evi-
dent to us that it was the insured's intention to 
settle under the terms of the policy when he 
wrote his letter of December 4, 1920. In this 
letter he inquired as to how much paid up in-
surance he could get. In the first place, the letter 
assumed that he was entitled to paid up insur-
ance, which assumption could only be referable 
to the policy provisions. The amount of paid 
up insurance was not to be an arbitrary sum, 
but was to be 'figured' so clearly that the insured 
could understand it. This assumes that is was 
to be figured upon some basis, and under the 
circumstances then existing it could have had 
reference to nothing but the provisions of the 
policy, which is mentioned by number in the 
letter. It is quite apparent from all the facts 
that the agreement between plaintiff and the in-
sured was that the settlement was to be made 
in accordance with the terms of an existing con-
tract or policy; that it was not to be a new con-
tract wholly outside the terms of the old one, 
or, in other words, a substitution of a new con-
tract for the old one; but that it was to be merely 
a continuation of the old contract under an op-
tion in favor of the insured that was provided 
for in it." 
See also the following cases: New York Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Kimball, 106 Atl. 676 (Vt.); Alabama Gold 
Life Insurance Co. v. Thomas, 74 Ala. 578; Holman 
v. Continental Life Insurance Co., (Conn.), 6 Atl. 405; 
People v. Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co., (New 
York), 9. N.E. 35. 
Defendant urges that Harriett P. Fawcett was not 
entitled, as a matter of right, to extended insurance for 
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the reason that her application therefor was not made 
while she was in good standing. No such requirement 
is to be found in Option VI of the contract. It is ap-
parent that the wording, 
"And has maintained his status as a member as 
required and prescribed in the Constitution and 
Laws of the association." 
refers to and must be read in connection with the three 
year period mentioned immediately preceding it. In 
other words, before the right to extended insurance ac-
crued, the insured must have made the periodical con-
tributions without default and "maintained his status 
as a member as required and prescribed in the Consti-
tution and Laws of the association" for a period of 
three years before making application. Does the three 
year period mean immediately preceding the making 
of the application, or does it mean subsequent to the 
date payments began. Clearly it means the latter for 
the reason given in Kennedy v. M.W.A., 92 Utah 487, 
69 Pac. (2d) 508, cited by defendant on page 36. The 
court, after referring to conditions precedent to the 
application for extended insurance, says at the top of 
the second column on page 510 of 69 Pac. (2d) :-
"The first condition clearly contemplates at 
least thirty-six consecutive monthly payments 
without any interruption. This is necessary in 
order that the proper reserve be built up to carry 
the extended insurance." 
The wording of the certificate in the Kennedy case 
was as follows: 
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"If all payments by the member have been regu-
larly made in full for three or more full years, 
then upon written request of the member, on 
forms to be furnished by the head clerk of the 
society, while this benefit certificate is in full 
force, the society will extend, etc." (Italics ours.) 
The conclusion that the provision in the contract before 
the court is equivalent to a statement that the appli-
cation must be made while the certificate is in full 
force, as in the Kennedy case, is unwarranted. 
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IV 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ESTOPPED TO 
CLAIM RIGHTS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
ENDORSEMENT. 
If the length of defendant's argument on this sub-
ject is indicative of the weight attached thereto, little 
need be said in answer. There is no basis for estoppel. 
The defendant has not been led to act differently or 
do anything, or fail to do anything, it would not other-
wise have done, in reliance on Mrs. Fawcett's failure 
to object to the terms of the endorsement. In order 
for the date of the endorsement to have made any dif-
ference Mrs. Fawcett would have to have contemplated 
dying between October 31, 1938 and November 16, 
1938. If she died before October 31, 1938, she would 
be protected under the terms of the endorsement. If 
she died after November 16, 1938, she would have 
been precluded from recovery. It seems wholly un-
warranted for the defendant to conclude that be-
cause she failed to make objection to the date con-
tained in the endorsement, when there was such a re-
mote chance of it making any difference, that by her 
failure to object she adopted it as her construction of 
the contract, or that her beneficiary should now be es-
topped to claim rights under the certificate inconsist-
ent with the endorsement. In other words, under the 
circumstances of this case, her having retained the cer-
tificate with the endorsement without objection is no 
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"' 
evidence at all of the construction she placed on the 
contract. Without lengthening this brief further, if 
the court is interested in this point it is fully discussed 
in a well written opinion by the late Justice McDer-
mott, in the case of Columbian National Life v. Black, 
35 F. (2d), 571. 
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v 
THE LAWS OF KANSAS HAVE NOT DE-
TERMINED THE QUESTION BEFORE THE 
COURT. 
The case of Wolford, Administratrix, v. National 
Life Ins. Co., 114 Kan. 411, 219 Pac. 263, cited by 
defendant on pages 14 and 38, and so strongly relied 
upon by defendant, does not decide the question before 
the court. We have heretofore stated that subject to 
the exceptions in I-A-5 herein, the majority view seems 
to be that the parties to an insurance contract have the 
right to contract that the second premium shall be-
come due on a date cetrain which is short of a month 
or year from the date the insurance became effective. 
The insurance in the Wolford case was granted in con-
sideration of an advance payment of $227.70, terminat-
ing on Nevember 14, 1918, and of the payment of an-
nual renewals on or before the 14th day of November 
thereafter. The Wolford case is subject to the same 
criticism as the other cases cited by defendant in this 
connection, in that defendant attempts to use a case 
involving a specific date as authority for its contention 
in the case at bar where only general language is used. 
For defendant to contend that its contention is upheld 
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CONCLUSION 
We have attempted in the foregoing argument to 
discuss the several points raised by the defendant on 
their merits, and also to state our own contentions and 
authorities in support thereof. 
By way of conclusion, may we add that it is not 
the disposition of courts to read more into an insur-
ance contract than is found there, especially when to 
do so would result in a forfeiture and limitation of 
the rights of the insured. Defendant cannot rely on 
strictness of adjudication unless the contract contains 
strict provisions therefor, as is borne out by the follow-
ing statement from the court in Sovereign Camp v. 
Rhyne, 158 So. 472, cited by defendant on page 17 of 
its brief: 
"When a party relies upon a time provision in· 
a contract as being the essence of that contract, 
it is no more than just that when he thus calls 
for strictness in adjudication, he should show 
that he has been as definite and certain in his 
contract stipulations in respect to the time relied 
upon as he is in the strictness to which he seeks 
to hold the other party in relation thereto." 
We sincerely maintain that the court should affirm 
the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY, ROMNEY & BOYER, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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